Copyright© Struan Hellier 2003 - Feel free to use this essay as you wish, but please leave my name on it.
An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of Hume's critique of miracles.
Although Hume's argument against miracles is, according to Hume himself, "as entire an argument from experience as can possibly be imagined," it is first necessary to examine the suggestion implicit in his writing that, a priori, miracles cannot exist. "Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happens in the course of nature." This argument is that the laws of nature are by definition regular and constant and that as a miracle is by definition a transgression of the laws of nature the very concept of a miracle is incoherent because these two definitions are mutually exclusive. If an miraculous event occurs, what we understood as the law of nature that it infringes is not in fact really a law of nature and thus no miracle can have occurred. It is simply that our knowledge of the laws of nature is inadequate. Important here is Hume's insistence that a miracle must be more than just an extraordinary event. It must be an act of God in violation of the laws of nature otherwise the term itself becomes meaningless for theist and atheist alike.
It seems to me that this problem is essentially derived from an atheist perspective. If one regards the laws of nature as encompassing everything then the paradox stands. If, however, one sees God as outside our perception of nature and the natural world as a self contained system within a larger whole, then it is possible to conceive of God suspending our systems laws of nature using a more fundamental set of laws of which we have no knowledge. If pressure is exerted on my bicycle pedal the wheels will turn. If however I push a stick into the spokes the wheel will stop. This outside interference does not effect the general law of bicycle mechanics except in this one instance. We can see then that the possibility of a miracle cannot be ruled out on a priori grounds.
Hume's argument from experience is more subtle and suggests that while it is possible for us to conceive of miracles occurring it is impossible for us to have sufficient empirical evidence to conclude that they have occurred, or ever will occur.
At the centre of the argument is the principle that on empiricist grounds the probability of a miracle occurring is by definition the most unlikely thing that could conceivably happen and therefore human testimony can never outweigh the unlikelihood of it being fact.
That the laws of nature are by definition the most unlikely things to be broken rest upon the principle that these laws, as we know them, are formed upon inductive reasoning from past observations. As every past experience has backed up the conclusion that these laws are uniform it follows that they have the highest possible standard of proof of their veracity. If human testimony is to overthrow this overwhelming proof then it must reach the same standard of empirical evidence otherwise we shall be forced to conclude that the testimony is false. Hume would contend that testimony could never reach these high standards because we know that people on many occasions have been shown to be mistaken or to be economical with the actuality.
Towards the end of part one Hume concludes that only if the falsehood of a testimony were, "more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish," could we accept a miracle.
There are problems with this view. Firstly as a concept it rests upon the argument that there is, "uniform experience," against Miracles. If there were not, then a miracle would not be the most improbable of events. But we can only conclude that there is uniform experience against miracles if we know that all testimony in favour of miracles is false. Uniform experience against miracles means that nobody has experienced a miracle but many people claim to have done just that. Conversely we can only know that all miracle reports are false if we can show that miracles never occurred and so the argument is incoherent, as it is self-defining.
Secondly there is a problem with the concept of regularity of nature itself and therefore with probability. Our experience of nature is very small if we consider the vastness of time and the innumerable events that must have occurred outside our observation. We assume that nature behaves in the same way when we are not observing it but this is an assumption that by definition cannot be derived from experience. In this way we must assume regularity in order to predict probable events. We cannot calculate the probability of regularity itself because probability depends upon regularity not vice versa. Again the problem is one of perspective. Probability in Hume's sense holds only within our own system but can have nothing to say upon the likelihood that the system itself may be intruded upon. It is probable that my bicycle will work tomorrow but this tells me nothing of the probability that I will break my leg tonight. To know this I must look elsewhere.
It would seem that a deadlock has been reached with neither side being able to use the tools of regularity or probability to establish their case. Hume has not been able to destroy the possibility of a miracle and so sets about demolishing the integrity of testimonies, which assert the truth of miracles. "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence," and so if Hume can show that testimony is poor evidence the weight of probability shifts in his direction.
Hume makes five points with this end in mind. Firstly, according to Hume, there have been no miracles in history in which the number and integrity of witnesses is beyond question. This of course would be disputed by many and reflects Hume's own view that testimony could never be of high enough standard to verify a miracle.
Secondly, humans want the pleasure they derive from believing the weird and wonderful and have a tendency to propagate it and seek it out. This is undoubtedly true as stage hypnotists and astrologers thrive upon obvious nonsense.
Thirdly that miracle stories abound amongst the uneducated and uncivilized or at least are received from such people
Fourthly that opposing miracles, such as claims of prophethood, will cancel each other out by requiring the falsehood of the other miracle. This argument looses its force as religions in modern times find pluralist interpretations allow for many paths to the same God.
Fifthly, the fact that miracles are used to start or support new religions reinforces the first point because people are not only attracted by nature to the weird and wonderful; they also have an additional need for religion. This is certainly true and many religions make a virtue out of blind faith and doubtless credulity.
These arguments seek to show not that a miracle is impossible but that due to the poor quality of human testimony we would be foolish to base religious beliefs upon them. Swinburne counters this conclusion using the principle of credulity, which states that we usually believe people unless we have good reason not to but Hume could respond that the violation of natural law is a very good reason to doubt. If my friend were to report to me that he had traveled on my cycle at 100 miles per hour I would have every right to be dubious. If he reported to me that he had traveled above the speed of light I would think him mad. This is a consistent empiricism, which weighs the principle of credulity against our experience of what is credible.
Hume may arguably have failed in his pursuit of a decisive argument against miracles but he has shown that they are not demonstrably any more likely to occur than not to occur and in doing so has shown that Philo at the conclusion of the dialogues cannot rely on revelation to take him the final step from Deism to Theism.