In February 1979 the Pahlavi monarchy finally collapsed after a year of mass demonstrations, strikes and confrontation. This cataclysmic event resulted in the deaths of thousands by execution and in the ensuing war with Iraq while at the same time forcing over half a million Iranians to flee into exile. (Backhash 1984 pg 4). Beyond Iran's borders the power vacuum caused by the severance of military and economic relations with the U.S.A facilitated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and upset the whole balance of power in the region. (Gasiorowski 1991 pg 227).

The West was astonished that such a seemingly stable state with an extremely effective secret police and powerful, loyal army could degenerate into anarchy so quickly, (Parsa 1989 pg 2), and the fear engendered by the program of radical Islamisation which ensued was palpable.

In this essay I will examine how various commentators have explained the revolution in Iran and in drawing all these explanations together, attempt to ascertain the main factors that caused this extraordinary event.

The social breakdown thesis comprises of a number of related factors that many have highlighted in explaining the revolution. The premise of this argument is that traditional social structures and values may become so undermined that the resulting Durkheimian sense of 'anamie' (dislocated identity) predisposes the populous to civil disorder, possibly manifested as revolution. (see Johnson 1966 and Smelser 1962).

In the case of Iran there were many reasons why this may have been what happened.

The current regime lead by the Pahlavi dynasty ruled by dictat and in opposition to the Islamic roots of the Iranian people. It was the expressed aim of the shah to make the pre-Islamic state of Persia the basis for Iranian identity as evidenced by the imposition in the 1960's of a new calender with Persian festivals and holidays to the exclusion of Islamic celebrations. (Rapoport 1993 pg 451). In addition campaigns were launched to encourage people to adopt European dress including the banning of the chador which contributed to the Mashhad riots of 1935 where the roles of victimised people and tyrannical king were confirmed in the minds of many and summed up by the popular chant of, "Husayn save us from the shah" (Fischer 1980 pg 186). The shah was in no mood to compromise and with the help of the West consolidated power with the result that by 1963 his power was absolute and his secret police (SAVAK) were given a free reign to eliminate political dissidence (Stempel 1981 pg 7).

The resulting sense of alienation felt by many in Iran was compounded by the perception that the shah was a puppet of the West and embraced Western modernist values of relativism, secularism and individualism with open arms. Norman Cohn showed that contact with technologically superior cultures adds to a sense of 'anamie' and predisposes groups to religious radicalism by forcing them to re-evaluate their own beliefs and customs (see Cohn 1957). For Iran, West-toxification became a huge issue which dominated the writings of many thinkers, not least Khomeini (1900-1989). West-toxification is often seen as the imposition of Western value systems upon traditional society in opposition to - and to the detriment of - the indigenous people. (Easterman 1992 pg 56-57).

Of vital importance to the undermining of the people's identity and an example of West-toxification was the secularisation not only of government but of other state institutions. Muslims in general regard religion and politics as inextricably linked believing that it is their duty to create a moral social order through political and social activism. (Esposito 1991 pg 30).

For Shi'ite Muslims this integration of the religious and political is even more accentuated by the tradition of a single leader (Imam) as the final authority on all political and religious matters rather than the Sunni concept of consensus (ijma) of the community (ulama) which often results in some separation of religious and political authority between various parties.

Secularisation of the education system caused fury in the religious community as did the exodus of the brightest students to American and British universities. By 1978 forty five thousand students a year were studying abroad, the highest proportion of foreign students in the world (Mottahedeh 1985 pg 65) and they, along with immigrant Western teachers and academics formed the backbone of the Iranian education system. In this new secular system the method of imparting knowledge to students was entirely different to traditional methods as was the content of the curriculum. With relativism replacing the old certainties of religious indoctrination and Qur'anic world view, students were encouraged to accept evolution and secularism as at least viable alternatives.

Another aspect of the breakdown model focuses upon the prevailing economic conditions. In particular the disjunction between economic and political development, (Green 1986), and the perception of relative deprivation caused by a huge gulf in living standards between rich and poor. (Keddie 1981).

With the discovery of vast oil reserves in the 1960's and 1970's Iran soon became one of the richest countries in the developing world. By means of the vast revenues provided by the sale of this oil and the resulting deep involvement of the U.S.A in Iran, the government achieved a high level of autonomy from the masses. Gasiorowski (1991) shows that decreasing reliance upon tax income and the ability to employ huge numbers of people on government projects meant that the shah became less responsive to his citizens and indeed exacerbated this unresponsiveness by military and police build up intended to protect oil supply and production for the industrialised nations.

Now Iran found itself in a situation where an educated emerging middle class perceived the shah as excluding them from the political process and, worse still, giving many of the best jobs to foreign workers thus misusing Iranian skills (Fischer 1980 pg 191).

By 1977 the economic prognosis was worsening with rampant inflation brought about by huge building programmes and corruption siphoning off profits. The shah imposed price regulation upon the bazaar blaming it for inflation and introduced restrictive laws upon foreign investment which caused many major investors to transfer assets abroad (Ibid pg 191).

The picture built up here is of a remote and corrupt government oppressive in the extreme, decadent and in league with the modernist, secular Western powers. A government with a distaste for Islam and a penchant for enforcing its views upon the people. Equally we see a disorientated population, uprooted from their rural lives, ignored by the state and desperate for certainties and identity in a just society. The conditions for revolution are to an extent in place but, as Parsa points out, this is not a complete picture as uprooted populations do not have the necessary resources and organisations for effective collective action, (1989 pg 5), hence the need for a complementary and additional line of explanation.

The social movement model builds upon the premise that of primary importance to the revolution were the religious values and structure of the clergy, focused and directed by and through the charismatic personality of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

To understand the prevailing psychology of the Iranian people we must first understand Shi'ite history and its sense of historic injustice which derives from the usurping of the right of Ali to the caliphate and even more importantly the raising of martyrdom to divine status which in turn derives from the assassination of Husayn at Karbala. (Sivan 1985 pg 187). Khomeini appealed to these powerful beliefs holding Mohammad, Ali and Husayn as examples to the people in their fight against the shahs regime. Another justification used by Khomeini for incitement to revolt was implicit in his acceptance of the role of precursor to the Mahdi, a messianic figure in much Muslim millenarian eschatology. (Keddie & Monian 1993 pg 512-513). Some Iranians viewed Khomeini himself as the Mahdi although there seems little evidence that he accepted this description despite there being no doubt that he gained legitimacy from association with these ideas.

Although it seems that middle class opposition groups, intelligentsia and professionals were instrumental in instigating protests during the early to middle 1970's, it was not until 1978 that the religious leaders put their full weight behind the protests. What started mainly as a reformist movement had now become a revolutionary movement, (Backhash 1984 pg 15), and the efficient infrastructure of the mosques rapidly helped one section of the clergy gain ascendancy over other interest groups. The organisation of the mosques was a vital factor that enabled a revolution to take place as there was no other group which had the authority or means to launch a serious insurrection within the state of Iran.

This answers Parsa's objection to the social breakdown thesis discussed earlier, by showing that dislocated groups in Iran did have access to the necessary resources for collective action. The institution of the mosque and the Islamic values there engendered were ubiquitous and had continuously reminded people of the roots they were being dragged away from by modernity and secularism.

Throughout the revolution clerics succeeded in explaining the world in purely black and white terms and although this does not necessarily result in violence it does generate a militant, absolutist and rejectionist attitude towards opponents. (Keddie & Monian 1993 pg 519). Khomeini often spoke of idolaters and devils in this context again appealing to the historic tradition of Shi'ite martyrology where opponents are seen as the embodiments of evil oppressing a virtuous majority.

Invariably the targets of revolutionary zeal were the polluting objects of Western secularism such as cinemas and banks (Rapoport 1993 pg 454) and the method of destruction was the traditionally purifying fire of all the religions of the Book. (see Deuteronomy 12:3). The death of 477 people in just such a fire in a cinema at Abadan was extremely significant as Khomeini managed to hold the government culpable (Backhash 1984 pg 17) forcing many concessions to the religious opposition which undermined still further the stability of the shah's regime.

Although the religious institutions were dominant in focusing the insurrection the support of almost all other opposition groups was very important in providing a united front against the government. As we have seen the shah had succeeded in alienating almost all sections of society from farmers through to the intelligentsia and by ruthlessly crushing all political opposition denied them a secular unified voice. The remnants of the National front and the Freedom party together with other repressed groups were devoid of communication networks and national organisation. This meant that they were obliged to support the Islamic forces of Khomeini or stand by and possibly watch the revolution fail. Khomeini had called for the overthrow of the government in early 1963 but this uprising had failed partly because at this time the opposition groups did not participate (Parsa 1989 pg 310) and few relished a repeat of this scenario. Ironically these groups received no reward in the ensuing Islamic Republic.

Just as the clergy were the only opposition group in a position to organise a revolution so Ayatollah Khomeini was the only man with the charisma and respect in a position to lead the clergy. This charisma derived from personality rather than religious office (Garvey 1993 pg 16) and his position of supreme leader arose because of his uncompromising stand against the shah. In exiling Khomeini, the shah unwittingly provided him with the ideal position from which to consolidate his position. While other leaders were unable or afraid to speak out in the face of the SAVAK Khomeini, with his highly developed communication system, was able to savage the regime from the safety of Paris by working through his supporters in Iran. (Taylor 1988 pg 65-68). Comparisons with the Mahdi, hidden from view and waiting to return to lead his people, are easy to construct from this point.

My analysis indicates that a number of related factors were of major importance to the Iranian revolution. The two main lines of explanation, namely the social breakdown model and the social movement model, are both vital constituents of an overall understanding. It seems likely that while the former predisposed the population to revolution, the latter precipitated the revolution providing the means of expression for the people's sense of threatened identity, repression and relative deprivation. The catalyst of the charismatic figure, Ayatollah Khomeini, focused the fears and hopes of the masses into a revolt against a decadent and corrupt regime which had squandered the country's wealth and set itself up in opposition to the core values of the society it controlled with ruthless force and the approval of the Western powers.

When all these factors converged and in the religious context of Shi'ism, revolution became almost inevitable.

Backhash S. - The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution - Basic Books - U.S.A - 1984.

Cohn N. - In Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages - St Albans - Paladin - 1957.

Easterman D. - New Jerusalems: Reflections on Islam, Fundamentalism and the Rushdie Affair - Grafton - London - 1992.

Esposito J.L - Islam The Straight Path - O.U.P - Oxford - 1991.

Fischer M.M.J - Iran, From Religious Dispute to Revolution - Harvard University Press - London - 1980.

Garvey J.H - Fundamentalism and politics - in Fundamentalisms and the State ed Marty & Appleby .- Chicago University Press - Chicago - 1993.

Green J. - Countermobilisation in the Iranian Revolution - in Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies ed Goldstone J. - Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch - San Diego - 1986.

Gasiorowski M.J - U.S Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran - Cornell University Press - London - 1991.

Johnson C. - Revolutionary Change - Boston - Little Brown - 1966.

Keddie N. - Roots of the Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran - Yale University Press - New Haven - 1983.

Keddie N. & Monian F. - Militancy and Religion in Contemporary Iran - in Fundamentalisms and the State ed Marty & Appleby - Chicago University Press - Chicago - 1993.

Mottahedeh R. - The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran - Chatto and Windus - London - 1985.

Parsa M. - Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution - Rutgers University Press - London - 1989.

Rapoport D.C - Comparing Fundamentalist Movements - in Fundamentalisms and the State ed Marty & Appleby - Chicago University Press - Chicago - 1993.

Sivan E. - Radical Islam: Mediaeval Theology and Modern Politics - Yale University Press - New Haven - 1985.

Smelser N. - Theory of Collective Behavoir - Free Press - New York - 1962.

Stempel J.D - Inside The Iranian Revolution - Bloomington - Indiana University Press - 1981.

The Holy Qur'an - London - Penguin - 1964.